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LIABILITY FOR AI DECISION-MAKING: SOME
LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Dr. Iria Giuffrida*
INTRODUCTION
Benjamin Franklin wrote that nothing is certain “except death and taxes.”1
A cynical former litigator, like the author, might add to those the certainty of
litigation as new technology creates an increasing number of real challenges.
With breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) and related technologies,
their uses are being implemented in government,2 finance,3 health care,4

* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law and Deputy Director, Center for Legal & Court
Technology, William & Mary Law School. This Article is based on the author’s presentation
at the Rise of the Machines: Artificial Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law
Symposium on February 15, 2019, organized by the Fordham Law Review and Fordham’s
Neuroscience and Law Center. The author is grateful to Professor Fredric Lederer for his
ongoing support and guidance, to Taylor Treece for her excellent research, and to Kazia
Nowacki, Lindsey Whitlow, and James Lomonosoff for invaluable additional research. All
errors are the author’s own. This work was supported by a grant from the Silicon Valley
Community Foundation, funded by Cisco Systems, Inc. For an overview of the Symposium,
see Deborah W. Denno & Ryan Surujnath, Foreword: Rise of the Machines: Artificial
Intelligence, Robotics, and the Reprogramming of Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 381 (2019).
1. Letter from Benjamin Franklin to Jean Baptiste Le Roy (Nov. 13, 1789), in 10 THE
WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, 1789–1790, at 68, 69 (Albert Henry Smyth ed., 1907).
2. There is a rich literature on the advancement of “smart cities.” See, e.g., Robert
Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. &
TECH. 103, 114–15 (2018); Rob Kitchin, The Real-Time City?: Big Data and Smart
Urbanism, 79 GEOJOURNAL 1, 1 (2014); Sofia Ranchordas & Abram Klop, Data-Driven
Regulation and Governance in Smart Cities, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN DATA SCIENCE AND
LAW 245, 245–73 (Vanessa Mak et al. eds., 2018).
3. Megan Ji, Note, Are Robots Good Fiduciaries?: Regulating Robo-Advisors Under
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1543, 1559 (2017); Tara Siegel
Bernard, The Pros and Cons of Using a Robot as an Investment Adviser, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29,
2016),
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/your-money/the-pros-and-cons-of-using-arobot-as-an-investment-adviser.html [https://perma.cc/3ZQL-XW2Y].
4. Bernard Marr, How Is AI Used in Healthcare—5 Powerful Real-World Examples That
Show the Latest Advances, FORBES (July 27, 2018, 12:41 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/bernardmarr/2018/07/27/how-is-ai-used-in-healthcare-5-powerful-real-worldexamples-that-show-the-latest-advances [https://perma.cc/L94B-WJRT]; Alvin Powell, The
Algorithm Will See You Now, HARV. GAZETTE (Feb. 28, 2019), https://news.harvard.edu/
gazette/story/2019/02/in-health-care-ai-offers-promise-and-hype/ [https://perma.cc/FF5HD6DX]; see also Iria Giuffrida & Taylor Treece, Keeping AI Under Observation: Anticipated
Impacts on Physicians’ Standard of Care, 22 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming Fall
2019).
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law,5 environmental protection,6 and education.7
AI plays varied functions in these applications. AI systems can be
descriptive as they tell you what happened; diagnostic as they tell you why
something happened; predictive as they forecast what will (statistically)
happen; and prescriptive in being capable of performing actual decisionmaking and implementation.8
The creation and commercialization of these systems raise the question of
how liability risks will play out in real life. However, as technical
advancements have outpaced legal actions, it is unclear how the law will treat
AI systems. This Article briefly addresses the legal ramifications and
liability risks associated with reliance on—or delegation to—AI systems, and
it sketches a framework suggesting how we can address the question of
whether AI merits a new approach to deal with the liability challenges it
raises when humans remain “in” or “on” the loop. This Article also suggests
that questions of how we, as a society, deal with those challenges have to be
connected to the broader ethical questions that AI evokes, such as whether
we really want to create a fully autonomous system that we cannot control
and how we could protect against “artificial stupidity.”9

5. For general legal practice, see, for example, Ed Walters, AI Practice, Not Promise, in
Law Firms, A.B.A. (Jan. 1, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice/
publications/law_practice_magazine/2019/january-february/JF2019Walters/
[https://perma.cc/NYR4-UTG8]. There is also a large offering of legal AI and analytics tools,
such as Lexis Advance, Context, Lex Machina, and Westlaw Edge. In the criminal justice
system, predictive systems—increasingly common tools designed to forecast recidivism
rates—are causing ethical and practical challenges. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS
HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS
OF MATH DESTRUCTION:
DEMOCRACY (2016); Ryan Calo, Artificial Intelligence Policy: A Primer and Roadmap, 3 U.
BOLOGNA L. REV. 180 (2018); Han-Wei Liu et al., Beyond State v. Loomis: Artificial
Intelligence, Government Algorithmization and Accountability, 27 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH.
122 (2019).
6. See generally WORLD ECON. FORUM, HARNESSING ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FOR THE
EARTH (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/Harnessing_Artificial_Intelligence_for_
the_Earth_report_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/NCA8-YRLD]. The University of Southern
California’s Center for Artificial Intelligence in Society hosted on February 8, 2019, a
symposium on AI for environmental conservation sponsored by the Microsoft AI for Earth
program. For further detail on the symposium’s agenda, see Symposium on AI for
Conservation, USC CTR. FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE SOC’Y, https://www.cais.usc.edu/
events/symposium-on-ai-for-conservation [https://perma.cc/AK9M-G264] (last visited Oct.
6, 2019).
7. Bernard Marr, How Is AI Used in Education—Real World Examples of Today and a
Peek into the Future, FORBES (July 25, 2018, 12:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
bernardmarr/2018/07/25/how-is-ai-used-in-education-real-world-examples-of-today-and-apeek-into-the-future [https://perma.cc/J37N-DL2Z]; see also AIED 2019: The 20th
International Conference on Artificial Intelligence in Education, AIED 2019, https://caedlab.com/aied2019 [https://perma.cc/HZU7-JMGX] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
8. Humberto Farias, Machine Learning Vs Predictive Analytics: What’s the Difference?,
CONCEPTA (Oct. 10, 2017), https://conceptainc.com/blog/machine-learning-vs-predictiveanalytics-what-is-the-difference/ [https://perma.cc/6QAS-MB47].
9. Nick Bostrom & Eliezer Yudkowsky, The Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 316, 316–34 (Keith Frankish & William
M. Ramsey eds., 2014).
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I. FACTORS IMPACTING LIABILITY RISK: AI SYSTEMS IN CONTEXT
Although the concept of AI has been around since at least the 1950s, it has
only recently reached the social consciousness (other than through science
fiction). Yet, no generally accepted definition exists.10 In its most basic
sense, AI refers to “the ability of a machine to perform cognitive functions
we associate with human minds, such as perceiving, reasoning, learning,
interacting with the environment, problem solving, and even exercising
creativity.”11 The growth of AI has been fostered by technical advances in
machine learning, which, rather unsophisticatedly, refers to the ability of an
AI system to modify itself by taking into account new data.12 Put differently,
without explicit programming, the machine “statistically learn[s]”13 from the
data it has processed. This is what computer scientists call a shift from
“deterministic to probabilistic computing.”14
AI can be extraordinarily capable of analyzing enormous amounts of data
to identify patterns and utilize them in a predictive or prescriptive sense.15
For instance, when exposed to a sufficient number of cat and dog images, an
AI system should then be capable of distinguishing between cat and dog
photos. In addition, given enough accurate initial data, an AI facial
recognition system should be able to identify a picture of an unknown person
with impressive accuracy;16 or, an AI may be able to predict future
criminality.17
Although oversimplistic and certainly not adequately descriptive of the
technical and sophisticated work necessary to create a useful and reliable AI
system, the basic steps in the creation of an AI based on machine learning
10. Calo, supra note 5, at 184–86; John McCarthy, What Is Artificial Intelligence?, STAN.
U. 2–3 (Nov. 12, 2007), http://jmc.stanford.edu/articles/whatisai/whatisai.pdf [https://
perma.cc/LRM5-UFKY].
11. An Executive’s Guide to AI, MCKINSEY & CO., https://www.mckinsey.com/businessfunctions/mckinsey-analytics/our-insights/an-executives-guide-to-ai [https://perma.cc/6372KDCM] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
12. Id.
13. Aditya Mohta, The Role of Artificial Intelligence in Digital Transformation, CISCO
LIVE
4,
https://www.ciscolive.com/c/dam/r/ciscolive/emea/docs/2019/pdf/PSODGT2370.pdf [https://perma.cc/S865-ZWMD] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019).
14. Noah D. Goodman, The Principles and Practice of Probabilistic Programming, 40
PROC. ANN. ACM SIGPLAN-SIGACT SYMP. ON PRINCIPLES PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES 399,
399–401 (2013).
15. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
16. See generally Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: Intersectional
Accuracy Disparities in Commercial Gender Classification, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING
RES. 77 (2018). However, contemporary American efforts appear to often fail due to
inadequate or biased training data. See, e.g., id. at 77. The Chinese government’s “social credit
system” uses vast amounts of data and is intended to identify individuals, if necessary, by
video image alone. See, e.g., Vicky Xiuzhong Xu & Bang Xiao, China’s Social Credit System
Seeks to Assign Citizens Scores, Engineer Social Behaviour, ABC: NEWS (Apr. 1, 2018, 11:38
PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-03-31/chinas-social-credit-system-punishesuntrustworthy-citizens/9596204 [https://perma.cc/UWF3-SHC6].
17. Julia Dressel & Hany Farid, The Accuracy, Fairness, and Limits of Predicting
Recidivism, 4 SCI. ADVANCES, Jan. 2018, at 1, 1 (concluding that “widely used commercial
risk assessment software COMPAS is no more accurate or fair than predictions made by
people with little or no criminal justice expertise”).
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are: (1) coding of the underlying AI program; (2) training the AI to
accomplish its function; and (3) ongoing self-modification by the AI based
on changes in the underlying data and feedback loops.
The risk of AI error is huge.18 Even if the basic program is accurate,
training the program requires an adequate amount of correct and nonbiased
data, a requirement that in our real world appears to be difficult to meet.19
Once applied to real-world instances, an AI exposed to a sufficient amount
of biased, false, or otherwise corrupted data may modify its “understanding”
to accept the biased or false information as accurate and perform its function
based on that erroneous data.20 But there’s more.
A. The “AI Ecosystem”
AI systems do not perform in an informational vacuum. AI is only one
part of the multiple modern technologies which interact with each other and
with the kinetic world around them. The key is the combination of all of
these technologies and more that constitutes the “AI Ecosystem”: AI systems
interacting in a data-rich environment, fueled by the “internet of things,”
enabled by sensors, blockchain, and other technologies.21 Data is constantly
created, exchanged, analyzed, pooled, and reassessed.22 Each of these
technologies carries independent liability risks. When they combine (as they
inevitably do in “real” life), the liability landscape becomes layered and
In addition to these machine-to-machine
increasingly complex.23
relationships, embedded within that AI Ecosystem is the relationship
between AI and humans, as data, programming, and usage can be affected by
fallible human beings.
These features make AI and related technologies sublimely useful but also
intrinsically problematic. Not only is it inherently difficult to determine why
an AI system reached a given output or decision24 but, because of how the
AI Ecosystem operates, it may be impossible to reverse engineer the
decision-making process to know on which data the AI system relied. This
18. Chris Hoffman, The Problem with AI: Machines Are Learning Things, but Can’t
Understand Them, HOW-TO GEEK (Jan. 6, 2019, 10:03 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/
394546/the-problem-with-ai-machines-are-learning-things-but-cant-understand-them/
[https://perma.cc/5PFK-ALPW]; cf. Buolamwini & Gebru, supra note 16, at 77.
19. Hoffman, supra note 18.
20. Thomas C. Redman, If Your Data Is Bad, Your Machine Learning Tools Are Useless,
HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 2, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/04/if-your-data-is-bad-your-machinelearning-tools-are-useless [https://perma.cc/Q34U-GWLE].
21. See generally Iria Giuffrida, Fred Lederer & Nicolas Vermeys, A Legal Perspective
on the Trials and Tribulations of AI: How Artificial Intelligence, the Internet of Things, Smart
Contracts, and Other Technologies Will Affect the Law, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 747 (2018).
22. See generally id.
23. See generally id.
24. Peter Holley, How Quickly Can AI Solve a Rubik’s Cube?: In Less Time Than It Took
You
to
Read
This
Headline.,
WASH.
POST
(July
16,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/16/how-quickly-can-ai-solve-rubikscube-less-time-than-it-took-you-read-this-headline [https://perma.cc/YF6S-J23A] (“But since
the algorithm was programmed merely to solve the puzzle, researchers were left with a limited
understanding of how it did so.” (emphasis added)).
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is the classic “black box problem” that reflects the lack of transparency and
explainability that may render AI decision-making processes impenetrable.25
B. Classic Tort Law
In the United States, tort law has two principal normative aims:
compensating tort victims and deterring future tortious conduct.26 The focus
of tort law is to determine who is liable for the loss suffered by the plaintiff
as caused by the tortfeasor’s wrongful act—an act from which it was
reasonably foreseeable that losses would flow.27 Tort suits involving harm
caused by devices usually allege either negligence from the tortfeasor or are
based on a theory of products liability.28 Liability for a defective product
applies when, among other possibilities, a reasonable alternative design
could have prevented or limited foreseeable risks of harm.29
In addition, many industries must comply with specific regulations and
rules. To the extent that AI predictive systems operate within a more highly
regulated industry, variations in those laws may expand or otherwise impact
the scope of liability for those products. The relevant concerns and risks
present in each industry have been incorporated directly into the laws
governing each of these sectors. For the purposes of this contribution, it is
not possible to enumerate the many, highly complicated legal rules that have
evolved along industry lines that may alter the liability risks incurred through
the use of AI predictive systems. Instead, the goal here is merely to flag the
AI tool’s nature and its industry application as potential variables to be
considered when assessing its liability risks.
II. DOES AI MERIT A NEW APPROACH TO LIABILITY?
From a liability perspective, where these technologies communicate and
engage with one another, the potential culpability for anything that could go
wrong shifts from one component to another as easily and quickly as the data
transferred between them. Deciding who is responsible for what when
something has gone wrong in a given case can be layered when many parties
come into play. There are AI developers; algorithm trainers; data collectors,
controllers, and processors; manufacturers of the devices incorporating the
AI software; owners of the software (which are not necessarily the
developers); and the final users of the devices (and perhaps many more
related hands in the pot).

25. See, e.g., Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the Failure of
Intent and Causation, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 889, 902–13 (2018) (describing how
transparency, complexity, and dimensionality issues combine to form an AI “black box”);
Alex John London, Artificial Intelligence and Black-Box Medical Decisions: Accuracy
Versus Explainability, HASTINGS CTR. REP., Jan.–Feb. 2019, at 15, 15–17 (2019).
26. 1 STUART M. SPEISER ET AL., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 1.3 (2013).
27. See id. § 1.4.
28. See 2A id. § 9:1; 5 id. § 18:1.
29. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (AM. LAW
INST. 1997).
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Does this mean that AI merits a new approach to liability? A review of
the literature suggests that there are roughly four possible answers to this
question. A word of caution: it is not suggested that this is an exhaustive list
of easily identifiable views but rather these possible answers operate on a
continuum. Most approaches tend to edge closer to one category rather than
the next depending on the context. The contribution that this Article offers
is a snapshot of how the question above could be answered, free from
normative implications.
A. Give AI Legal Personhood
In the complex AI Ecosystem, a plaintiff would need to establish whom to
sue. If liability is hard to pin onto a particular tortfeasor (or group of
tortfeasors), why could the AI itself not be held liable30 if we were to treat
AI systems as we do corporations?31 In tort law, the concept of joint and
several liability or the ability to sue anyone in the commercial chain for
products liability claims suggests the likelihood of multiple possible
defendants, especially as plaintiffs take into account the traditional interest
in reaching a “deep pocket” capable of paying large damages. Absent use of
comprehensive waivers, the AI Ecosystem will likely produce harms that will
be litigated under traditional tort law. Whether traditional tort law and
liability are the best ways to deal with modern technology is a more difficult
question.
The idea of granting AI systems personhood is not science fiction but
rather a legal fiction.32 This approach rests on premises that would have to
be explored further in a different venue. Suffice it to say that for it to work,
it is necessary, at the very least, for the AI system to be capable of holding
assets either directly (as a corporation would) or indirectly (assuming that
either the licensor or the licensee of the AI system is to act on the AI system’s
behalf, as Jessica S. Allain suggests).33 Unless the plaintiff can enforce a
successful judgment to obtain redress for the loss suffered and that redress is
most commonly financial, the purpose of granting legal personhood would
be defeated in the first instance. For the purpose of this Article, the
interesting aspect of the “AI legal personhood” line of reasoning is that,
although it suggests a major change, it still aims at using existing legal rules
to both advocate for and implement that change.
The liability risk associated with AI systems may vary depending on the
nature of the AI—for example, whether the AI system is sold or licensed as

30. See generally Gerhard Wagner, Robot, Inc.: Personhood for Autonomous Systems?,
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 591 (2019); Horst Eidenmüller, The Rise of Robots and the Law of
Humans (Mar. 26, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https:// papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941001 [https://perma.cc/S7TT-GZBG].
31. Cf. Jessica S. Allain, Comment, From Jeopardy! to Jaundice: The Medical Liability
Implications of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence Systems, 73 LA. L. REV. 1049,
1078–79 (2013).
32. See, e.g., id. at 1078.
33. See id.
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a software or service or whether it is embedded in a tangible device.34 The
law often treats tangible items differently than intangible ones. For example,
this is true for contractual liability, whereby the governing law may entirely
change depending upon whether the AI is a “good” for sale.35 The liability
risk will also depend on the function of the AI output: is the system a
predictive one on whose predictions humans base their decisions or is it fully
autonomous such that the humans are “out of the loop,”36 borrowing from
the military terminology?37
AI systems are usually envisioned as making and executing decisions
without human involvement. That is not necessarily so. Indeed, under
European Union law, automated decisions that have legal or similar effects
on individuals, as AI decisions may, are required to be subject to some type
of human review.38 That complicates the liability question by at least
potentially putting another human being (or perhaps his or her legal person
principal) at risk of liability.
Harm caused by an AI system could be the direct consequence of the AI’s
programming, perhaps giving rise to an intentional tort; negligent design,
training, or operation (e.g., lack of adequate cybersecurity protections); or an
arguably unforeseeable harm caused by an interaction with unforeseeable
real-world data.

34. AI systems are composed of algorithms and enabled by sophisticated software.
Software is not necessarily considered a product but rather a service traditionally falling
outside the reach of products liability. No case has yet applied strict products liability to
software, though the Ninth Circuit has suggested, in dicta, that it may be possible to do so. See
Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035 (9th Cir. 1991). See generally
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 19 (AM. LAW INST. 1997).
35. See Mitigating Product Liability for Artificial Intelligence, JONES DAY: INSIGHTS
(Mar.
2018),
https://www.jonesday.com/mitigating-product-liability-for-artificialintelligence-03-21-2018 [https://perma.cc/27F4-RCNY].
36. See generally PETER SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND
CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2009).
37. There have been recent examples of highly sophisticated autonomous systems causing
serious losses when they shut humans out of the loop. In the case of the Boeing 737 Max
planes, it is alleged that the new Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System
automatically pushed the plane’s nose downward when the sensors detected that a stall might
be imminent, causing the fatal crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 on October 29, 2018, and
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 on March 10, 2019. See, e.g., Anurag Kotoky, Boeing’s
Grounded 737 Max—the Story so Far, WASH. POST (July 5, 2019), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/business/boeings-grounded-737-max-the-story-sofar/2019/07/04/bc7ed860-9e52-11e9-83e3-45fded8e8d2e_story.html
[https://perma.cc/
2X8Y-NQPH]. In March 2019, the engines of the Viking Sky cruise ship shut down in the
middle of the tempestuous North Sea when, it is said, the sensors detected low oil level and
forced the shutdown, leaving over one thousand passengers to be rescued by helicopter. See,
e.g., Lance Eliot, Human In-the-Loop Vs. Out-of-the-Loop in AI Systems: The Case of AI SelfDriving Cars, AI TRENDS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.aitrends.com/ai-insider/human-in-theloop-vs-out-of-the-loop-in-ai-systems-the-case-of-ai-self-driving-cars/
[https://perma.cc/
2DSR-R2CQ].
38. Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016
on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection
Regulation), art. 22, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 46 (EU).
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An individual’s or organization’s liability for tort stems directly from the
potential tortfeasor’s duty to avoid the harm that would result from the
tortfeasor’s conduct39 or, as it has more traditionally been phrased, to avoid
foreseeable harm.40 To be held liable for tortious harm, that harm must be
both the actual and legal result of the allegedly tortious act.41 Given cases,
such as Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co.,42 which show the doctrine of
proximate or legal cause and manifest a limit to the duty of care, pure logical
or actual causation is insufficient to establish tort liability.43 Modern
technology can raise substantial proximate cause issues.
Let us consider a simple hypothetical. Homeowner buys a “smart” smoke
detector for her house. She buys the specific product because it has Wi-Fi
capability which permits the vendor to send her a fire alarm notice to her
smartphone if any of the sensors detect smoke or fire. She is particularly
taken by the low cost of the internet-of-things product. A year later, she
discovers that her home computer has been “hacked” and critical private
banking data has been extracted and used in a way that greatly harmed her.
The “hack” was made possible by the fact that the smoke detector was
connected to her home Wi-Fi network, it had substandard cybersecurity
protection (which is why it was so cheap), and the hacker penetrated her
computer via the smoke detector.44 During depositions, counsel learned that
the defendant smoke alarm company had taken reasonable measures to
protect its computer system but had not considered the detector itself to be a
risk.
Rapid technological developments make it difficult to determine “risk,”
particularly in the price-sensitive commercial sector. The smoke detector
example is a relatively simple one. Consider the more elaborate hypothetical
often used by my William & Mary colleague, Professor Fred Lederer.
Company is responsible for operating a dam and generating hydroelectric
power. Company decides to modernize in order to be more efficient. It
replaces its human-operated control system with a fully autonomous AI
system. To enable the AI to function, Company installs a large number of
sensors throughout the dam and the area in which the dam is. They collect
temperature, moisture, stress, and other readings and send them via the
internet to the AI. The “AI” actually consists of a number of components.
The primary component is located in Company’s primary corporate office
some five hundred miles away. It constantly monitors the sensor data and
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 29 (AM. LAW INST. 2005).
40. Id. § 29 cmt. j.
41. SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 1:10.
42. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (involving a plaintiff who was injured at a busy train station
by a heavy metal scale after it fell on her as an apparent result of train employees helping a
passenger board a train, causing the passenger to drop a box of fireworks that exploded).
43. 3 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 11:1.
44. For a similar real case involving the penetration of a casino network via an aquarium
sensor, see Alex Schiffer, How a Fish Tank Helped Hack a Casino, WASH. POST (July 21,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2017/07/21/how-a-fish-tankhelped-hack-a-casino [https://perma.cc/2X5N-YUNW].
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varies water flow on a continuous basis. It implements its decisions via
instructions to its implementation module in the dam control room on site.
Meanwhile the AI modifies its programming based upon its ongoing
experience of the interaction of all the monitored sensor factors in order to
produce the most electricity at the cheapest operating cost while maintaining
community safety. The AI is also connected, via the internet, to other dam
systems so that it can learn from how those systems are operating.
One night, the AI fully opens the emergency floodgates and floods one
thousand homes downstream. Company investigates and cannot determine
causation. Possibilities include: defective AI design; defective AI training;
defective sensor design and/or manufacture; unforeseen consequences from
multiple data inputs in real world circumstances; erroneous AI operation
based upon sensor or remote data; and external interference, that could have
been accidental or intentional, by either one or more private actors or on
behalf of a foreign organization or nation. Notably, the sensors are from
multiple companies and may have never been used together prior, certainly
not in the instant configuration.
Causation and responsibility may be impossible to determine in the dam
case. Every tort student’s joy, res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for itself),
which sometimes allows a court to conclude that a defendant must have been
negligent because that is the only reasonable explanation for the harmful
act,45 cannot apply here. If nothing else, the possibility of external causation
provides an alternative to system defects.46
Given multiple tortfeasors, American courts can usually apportion
damages in a reasonable fashion.47 That assumes, however, that the
tortfeasors can be identified. Although traditional tort law provides a vehicle
by which harm caused by the AI Ecosystem could potentially be
compensated for, difficulties in proving causation may make that impossible.
Critically, the difficulty in proving causation in these cases is “a feature and
not a bug” and likely unavoidable in many cases.48
B. Leave AI Alone
The proponents of “leave AI alone” take a systemic view of the legal
system, which is dynamic and capable of coping with the challenges posed
by the so-called new technologies. Judge Frank Easterbrook famously said:
[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors is to
study general rules. Lots of cases deal with sales of horses; others deal with
people kicked by horses; still more deal with the licensing and racing of
horses, or with the care veterinarians give to horses, or with prizes at horse
shows. Any effort to collect these strands into a course on “The Law of the
45. 2A SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 9:1.
46. Of course, in such a case, the lack of adequate cybersecurity may be the defect.
47. See, e.g., WARD FARNSWORTH & MARK F. GRADY, TORTS: CASES AND QUESTIONS
345–50 (2d ed. 2009).
48. Edwina Rissland, Artificial Intelligence and Law: Stepping Stones to a Model of Legal
Reasoning, 99 YALE L.J. 1957, 1962 (1990).
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Horse” is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles. Teaching
100 percent of the cases on people kicked by horses will not convey the law
of torts very well. Far better for most students—better, even, for those who
plan to go into the horse trade—to take courses in property, torts,
commercial transactions, and the like, adding to the diet of horse cases a
smattering of transactions in cucumbers, cats, coal, and cribs. Only by
putting the law of the horse in the context of broader rules about
commercial endeavors could one really understand the law about horses.49

If an AI system makes a prediction or a decision, especially without
substantial human involvement or oversight, the issue will be by what
standard we should determine liability when unacceptable harm occurs but
its causation cannot be determined.
The “leave AI alone” approach would remind us that the evolution of
products liability law in the United States demonstrates that the legal system
is capable of coping with difficulties in proving causation. Tort liability for
harm caused by products applies even when the manufacturer proceeded
reasonably and without negligence.50 The only questions to be asked usually
are: did the product cause harm, and, if so, was there a reasonable way to
avoid that harm, even if we make that determination only through perfect
hindsight?
“Self-driving” cars have raised the issue of AI liability most clearly. We
want to encourage technological innovation while assisting those who may
be hurt by the technology during and after the development period. Tort
lawsuits could effectively stifle development. There are instances where
traditional tort liability has been replaced either because it is substantially
inefficient, such as in the case of no-fault auto insurance,51 or outweighed by
its potential negative consequences, as with the original September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund—an administrative claims process to protect the
airlines from potential massive liability.52 In the case of self-driving cars,
various jurisdictions have legislated or considered different approaches.53
One arguably attractive solution is to create a compulsory no-fault quasiinsurance system in which the victim of a self-driving car receives a payment

49. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
207, 207–08.
50. See, e.g., 5 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 26, § 18:2 n.16.
51. Background on: No-Fault Auto Insurance, INS. INFO. INST. (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-no-fault-auto-insurance [https://perma.cc/Y4K265XP].
52. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat.
230 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.). See generally KENNETH
R. FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COMPENSATE THE
VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005).
53. For an overview of federal and state legislation, see Autonomous Vehicles: SelfDriving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NCSL (Sept. 4, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/
research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx
[https://perma.cc/F4MB-L3B9] and Autonomous Vehicles State Bill Tracking Database,
NCSL (Aug. 30, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicleslegislative-database.aspx [https://perma.cc/HH33-QQFZ].
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without the need to show why the automobile caused the harm.54 The funds
for the payment system would come from a surtax on each self-driving car.55
C. Robot Common Sense
Notably, a claims process assumes compensation and, in the case of
unclear causation, compensation could be unfair. Or, compensation might
slow or stop technological development. Accordingly, the most basic way to
cope with AI Ecosystem harm may be to simply live with the harm as a
necessary societal cost. There is precedent for such a result. In 2016, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court decided State v. Loomis.56 In Loomis, the criminal
defendant was sentenced by a judge who took into account during sentencing
the results of an AI predictive product, COMPAS.57 The defense challenged
the use of the AI tool and demanded access to the coding of its algorithm.58
The trial judge denied the request on the basis of the trade secret evidentiary
privilege.59 The defendant complained inter alia of a due process violation
because the sentencing court did not have accurate information, in part
because the proprietary nature of COMPAS prevented him (and any other
third party, including the court itself) from assessing its accuracy.60 And in
fact, ProPublica published a scathing criticism of COMPAS’s accuracy a few
months before the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s decision was rendered.61
The Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the use of the AI.62 In large part,
the opinion is based on the fact that it was the judge who sentenced the
defendant—not the AI. The COMPAS prediction was only one factor,63 and
the defendant had access to the questions used to produce the data given to
the AI.64 But, there is an undertone in the opinion which suggests that
another reason was important: human sentencing is filled with flaws.65
54. Cf. Giuffrida, Lederer & Vermeys, supra note 21, at 765.
55. See id. at 764 n.58.
56. 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016).
57. COMPAS stands for Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative
Sanctions, and it is a relatively common criminal risk assessment tool. Equivant, the entity
developing “software for justice,” states that COMPAS is a management support tool that
“helps inform your critical decisions and mitigate . . . risk.” Classification Module, EQUIVANT,
https://www.equivant.com/compas-classification [https://perma.cc/BJ24-PU8P] (last visited
Oct. 6, 2019).
58. Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 22–25, Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (No.
2015AP000157-CR).
59. Id. at 3. The complexity of AI coding, training, and operation gives rise to the
movement for “Explainable AI.” In Loomis, the evidentiary privilege mooted even the
possibility of examining the code to better understand its results. See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at
753.
60. Id. at 757.
61. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias: There’s Software Used Across the Country to
Predict Future Criminals. And It’s Biased Against Blacks, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016),
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing
[https://perma.cc/4RVR-KD5A].
62. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 772.
63. Id. at 753, 767–68, 771.
64. Id. at 761–62.
65. See id. at 765.
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Technology-augmented sentencing, however erroneous, has at least the
possibility of improving over time and curing the current—and defective—
human system.66 In short, we should live with arguably inadequate AI
because in the long term its descendants may be better than what we
otherwise would use.
The Loomis decision is an illustration of how “robot common sense” is
making its way into the legal system. With “robot common sense,” we refer
not only to the legal system adapting concepts such as reasonableness and
foreseeability to capture the nuances brought in by AI and new technologies
but also to our expectation that an AI system will update its common sense
by learning from external input.67 Perhaps machine learning is more robust
and less fallible than human learning, and “robot common sense” is
preferable to the reasonable person standard. Or perhaps not—at least not in
the criminal justice context.68
D. New (Non-Legal) Rules for AI: Is Code Law?
If we are to use a compensation-oriented system for AI Ecosystem harms,
a more general approach may be useful. In their 2019 article “Remedies for
Robots,” Mark Lemley and Bryan Casey suggest a harms-based approach.69
Potential harms include unavoidable or inherent harms; deliberate or leastcost harms; defect-driven harms; misuse harms; unforeseen harms; systemic
harms; and collateral harms.70
In this line of reasoning, the compensation-deterrence methodology could
be harm-specific, rather than focusing on the tortfeasor(s). If self-driving
cars contain unavoidable risks, no-fault compensation may be appropriate.
Ascertained intentional least-cost harms may merit a lawsuit via some form
of products liability approach.
Starting with specific risks of harm has been a favorite strategy within
more developed areas of technology regulation in the United States. For
example, within the fields of data privacy and cybersecurity, federal
standards have migrated towards a risk-based approach, allowing flexibility
for data controllers and processors to determine their individual risk and risk

66. This, however, presupposes that the AI is learning from either fresh data or supervised
learning rather than, as some worry, crystallizing the bias and repeating it ad infinitum. See,
e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV.
671, 677–93 (2016); Kate Crawford, The Hidden Biases in Big Data, HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr.
1, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/04/the-hidden-biases-in-big-data [https://perma.cc/EQQ8ZQU6].
67. Curtis E. A. Karnow, The Application of Traditional Tort Theory to Embodied
Machine Intelligence, in ROBOT LAW 51, 53–61 (Ryan Calo et al. eds., 2016); Harry Surden
& Mary-Anne Williams, Technological Opacity, Predictability, and Self-Driving Cars, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 147–48 (2016).
68. See generally Anne Washington, How to Argue with an Algorithm: Lessons from the
COMPAS-ProPublica Debate, 17 COLO. TECH. L.J. 131 (2018).
69. See generally Mark A. Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1311 (2019).
70. Id. at 1327–42.
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tolerance on a case-by-case basis.71 Similar approaches have been suggested
for AI,72 as the nature and degree of the risks associated with the technology
will require different governance and will potentially lead to divergent
liability outcomes. It is therefore important to decide, when AI intersects
with these areas of law, which harms we are looking to avoid and who is best
able to prevent the harms (and thus who should be held accountable for
failing to do so).73
Theories of liability, along with legal and equitable remedies, are often
founded on a certain belief about human motivation—the innate desire to
avoid punishment. These remedies are arguably ill-suited for AI systems,
and thus do not carry the same weight in shaping AI’s behavior (assuming
behavior is even the right term). To apply the same approach to AI, Lemley
and Casey suggest that the incentives would need to be coded, according to
relative weights, directly into the algorithms, which is a difficult feat.74
There are significant ethical and philosophical considerations behind
assigning numeric significance to competing priorities, not to mention the
practical problem of effectively coding this incentive system into more
sophisticated machine learning apparatuses. Not all remedies are designed
solely to affect behavior, and, often, the ability to shape and control harm is
limited by which theory of liability is applied. Harm-based remedies,75 as
opposed to those based on the idea of human desire to avoid punishment,76
may more appropriately apply in the AI context. In light of the above
practical challenges, companies that are able to internalize the costs of
potential liability may elect to do so, rather than avoid the behavior. The
likelihood of successful claims may well be low, making the likelihood of

71. See, e.g., Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, 44 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(4) (Supp. 2014); NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR IMPROVING
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY 1 (2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/
CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf [https://perma.cc/RG2P-PZ2H]. However, some states
have taken a different approach. For example, under Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy
Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2019), the Illinois Supreme Court held that plaintiffs are not
required to show that they suffered harm other than a violation of the law in order to launch
proceedings. Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 129 N.E.3d 1197, 1207 (Ill. 2019).
72. See generally Antje von Ungern-Sternberg, Artificial Agents and General Principles
of Law, 60 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 239 (2017); Wagner, supra note 30.
73. See sources cited supra note 72.
74. See generally Lemley & Casey, supra note 69. For the idea of “code is law,” see
generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 (2006) and Lawrence Lessig, The Law of
the Horse: What Cyberspace Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999).
75. See, e.g., Consequential Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(“Losses that do not flow directly and immediately from an injurious act but that result
indirectly from the act.”); Expectation Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(“Compensation awarded for the loss of what a person reasonably anticipated from a
transaction that was not completed.”).
76. See Punitive Damages, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Damages
awarded in addition to actual damages when the defendant acted with recklessness, malice, or
deceit . . . .”).
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less-costly settlements far greater.77 If the popularity of and the high demand
for AI products continue, it may simply become worth the risk.
Risk-based, least-cost avoidance liability approaches have also attracted a
fair number of critics.78 They argue that the liability regime predominant in
law creates, or at least preserves, the status quo for a system of profit
maximization.79 In other words, it creates a floor for avoiding the worst
behaviors but not a ceiling of best uses to aspire towards. There is incentive
to avoid the worst errors but perhaps not enough to entice companies to
innovate and create the best possible results. What is more, where injury
seems likely to occur, companies may choose to simply accept the risk and
externalize the predicted costs of liability by increasing consumer prices. In
this case, whatever incentive structure may have existed to avoid harm
through financial motivations is eliminated.80
If we use regulation rather than tort suits, regulators will have to decide
optimal risk tolerances: how much harm are we willing to allow to obtain
the social benefits of AI? More lenient liability rules will allow more harms
to go uncompensated, but this in turn incentivizes more—and especially
smaller—developers to innovate and potentially create better AI systems
without the fear of large lawsuits. Some scholars are, however, quick to point
out that liability rules do not need to be one-size-fits-all, and the severity of
the harms caused can be a major determining factor for when harsher or more
lenient liability rules apply.81
Whether we are to use current tort law, claims processes, or regulatory
devices, we must unavoidably deal with a cost-benefit analysis. If we adapt
existing legal frameworks, our benefits are: (1) that we need only adapt
current law, which we are used to doing; and (2) that common law allows
case-by-case resolution—even when dealing with unexpected matters. The
arguable drawbacks are: (1) the likely unintended legal consequences which
may impede technology development or business; (2) the gaps until new
harms or new cases arise; (3) the rules that are likely to vary greatly in their
speed of development and sufficiency, depending upon the legal and
economic sector involved; and (4) the legal uncertainty that discourages
capital investment and use of novel science and technology.
However, adopting new legal frameworks inevitably involves substantial
error while we cope with the pragmatic effects of untried rules or
procedures—especially as technology changes constantly.

77. Bryan Casey, Amoral Machines, or: How Roboticists Can Learn to Stop Worrying
and Love the Law, 111 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 231, 242–46 (2017).
78. For a critical analysis of the literature, see generally Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence,
Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291 (1992).
79. See id. at 1350.
80. Casey, supra note 77, at 242–44.
81. See generally Lemley & Casey, supra note 69.
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III. AI ADVANCES: AN “ESCALATOR FROM HELL”?82
Determining how legal rules should apply to liability for losses caused by
AI systems will take time, but in the interim AI is making strides in everyday
life. The medical profession has enshrined the duty to “do no harm.”83
Perhaps that should be the critical organizing principle in these early days of
the AI Ecosystem. Rather than attempting to adapt or create a full
compensatory system for AI harms, we should instead focus on identifying
and dissuading (and perhaps compensating) the major predictive harms, with
the understanding that constant reevaluation will be necessary. In doing so,
we would therefore be wise to contemplate the emerging ethical codes for AI
systems.
While considering the morality of machines may be unnecessary, if not
futile, at this stage,84 those who use AI systems are fallible, corruptible,
imperfect human beings. From intentional misuses of AI systems85 to
unintentional consequences,86 developing AI cannot be done in the abstract.
As Sir Robin Knowles, an English High Court judge, said recently, an ethical
and legal framework is “imperative” for AI.87 He is not alone in calling for
ethics to be embedded in the regulation of AI.88
Efforts have already been made. The “trolley problem” has been adapted
to an AI-augmented reality because AI systems have life-or-death

82. Alex Hern, New AI Fake Text Generator May Be Too Dangerous to Release, Say
Creators, GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/14/
elon-musk-backed-ai-writes-convincing-news-fiction
[https://perma.cc/AUJ2-8W33]
(quoting Jack Clark, the policy director of OpenAI).
83. 1 STEVEN E. PEGALIS, AMERICAN LAW OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE § 3:8 (3d ed. 2019).
84. See generally Casey, supra note 77.
85. Examples abound, but see, for instance, “deep fakes,” which are “hyper-realistic
digital falsification of images, video, and audio.” See generally Bobby Chesney & Danielle
Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for Privacy, Democracy, and National Security,
107 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3213954 [https://
perma.cc/9HKQ-ABZX]. In February 2019, OpenAI refused to make available its newest AI
model, GPT2, because OpenAI considered GPT2’s capabilities so strong that the risk of
malicious and nefarious uses outweighed the benefit of sharing the results of its research for
an open and informed discussion about practical as well as ethical implications. See Hern,
supra note 82.
86. Think, for instance, of unconscious bias in AI recruitment systems. See, e.g., Jeffrey
Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool That Showed Bias Against Women, REUTERS
(Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/
amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-bias-against-womenidUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/44EK-3ABF].
87. Nick Hilborne, High Court Judge: Ethical and Legal Framework for AI
“Imperative,” LEGAL FUTURES (Nov. 13, 2018), https://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latestnews/high-court-judge-ethical-and-legal-framework-for-ai-imperative
[https://perma.cc/27FQ-P3YU].
88. See generally Luciano Floridi et al., AI4People—an Ethical Framework for a Good
AI Society: Opportunities, Risks, Principles, and Recommendations, 28 MINDS & MACHINES
689 (2018).
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implications89: self-driving cars90 are on our roads and accidents are already
occurring.91 How will a self-driving car act when harm is unavoidable? The
importance of ethics in the discourse surrounding the growth of AI systems
both in terms of uses and capabilities cannot be underestimated. However,
space constraints dictate that only few considerations can be put forward in
this Article.
Ethical codes are starting to emerge, and not only from academic circles.
In December 2018, the European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice
of the Council of Europe92 adopted the European Ethical Charter on the Use
of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems93 (the “Charter”). A few days
later, the High-Level Expert Group on AI appointed by the European
Commission published the first draft of its Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy
AI, the final version of which was released in mid-2019.94 These guidelines
make it clear that developments in AI do not take place in a lawless vacuum
but under the rule of law of the European Union (e.g., the Charter and the
General Data Protection Regulation) and international law (e.g., U.N. human
rights treaties).95 The report goes so far as to propose “[a] future where
democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights underpin AI systems.”96
The report also offers four key principles underpinning the development of
AI systems: respect for human autonomy, prevention of harm, fairness, and

89. The “trolley problem” is a thought experiment developed by ethicists and moral
philosophers to highlight the moral and ethical challenges of binary choices involving lifeand-death decisions. Kyle Wiggers, MIT Study Explores the “Trolley Problem” and SelfDriving Cars, VENTUREBEAT (Oct. 24, 2018, 4:40 PM), https://venturebeat.com/2018/
10/24/mit-study-explores-the-trolley-problem-and-self-driving-cars [https://perma.cc/J55GKERC].
90. Although not yet fully autonomous, self-driving cars have many autonomous features.
Doug DeMuro, 7 Best Semi-Autonomous Systems Available Right Now, AUTOTRADER (Jan.
2018),
https://www.autotrader.com/best-cars/7-best-semi-autonomous-systems-availableright-now-271865 [https://perma.cc/U8MM-DDWK].
91. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Self-Driving Uber Car Kills Pedestrian in Arizona, Where
Robots Roam, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/
technology/uber-driverless-fatality.html [https://perma.cc/3NUV-D6PM].
92. The Council of Europe is an international organization not to be confused with the
European Union.
93. European Comm’n for the Efficiency of Justice, European Ethical Charter on the Use
of Artificial Intelligence in Judicial Systems and Their Environment, COUNCIL EUR.,
https://rm.coe.int/ethical-charter-en-for-publication-4-december-2018/16808f699c [https://
perma.cc/U8F7-N6VA] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019). Key principles include respect for
fundamental rights by compatible design and implementation of AI tools and services;
nondiscrimination, “specifically prevent[ing] the development or intensification of any
discrimination between individuals or groups of individuals”; quality and security for “the
processing of judicial decisions and data”; “transparency, impartiality and fairness” through
“data processing methods accessible and understandable,” and external audits; and
“preclud[ing] a prescriptive approach and ensur[ing] that users are informed actors and in
control of the choices made.” Id. at 7.
94. See High-Level Expert Grp. on Artificial Intelligence, Ethics Guidelines for
Trustworthy AI (Apr. 8, 2019), https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?
doc_id=60419 [https://perma.cc/L3JA-TR7B].
95. Id. at 6.
96. Id. at 9.
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explicability.97 Notably, it does not attempt to limit what developers can do
with AI. Rather, it flags areas of “critical AI concern,” the legal ramifications
of which are not yet fully understood.98
More recently, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has put forward the
foundation of its own vision for ethics in AI which, unsurprisingly, has a
different tenor from the European approach. In May 2019, the Beijing
Academy of Artificial Intelligence99 (BAAI) released the Beijing AI
Principles,100 which were followed in July 2019 by the Governance
Principles for the New Generation Artificial Intelligence, published by the
National Governance Committee for the New Generation Artificial
Intelligence (the “Governance Principles”).101 Interestingly, the Beijing AI
Principles appear to suggest that informed consent must be sought by AI
developers before individuals use their products,102 opening the door for
potential data protection measures that echo the European ones. There is
even a statement, if the translation is to be trusted, that “[h]uman privacy,
dignity, freedom, autonomy, and rights should be sufficiently respected. AI
should not be used to against, utilize or [sic] harm human beings.”103 The
Governance Principles make a timid reference to respecting human rights,
but subject to “social security” (a peaceful, law-abiding society), and they
include a reference for the need for AI-users to be informed of potential
risks.104
However, the overarching objectives that the PRC’s ethical vision pushes
forward are aligned with its goal of becoming the leading AI power by 2030.
As James Lomonosoff puts it, this reveals the Chinese government’s
security-first approach, which goes hand-in-hand with the export of the
surveillance state;105 this is in contrast with the humanity-first approach of
the European Union, which, although linked to notions of rule of law and
democracy, has not yet put forward any legal frameworks.

97. Id. at 12.
98. Id. at 33; see James Lomonosoff, The European Union and China: Two Differing
Approaches to Ethics in Artificial Intelligence, CTR. FOR LEGAL & CT. TECH. (2019),
https://legaltechcenter.openum.ca/files/sites/159/2019/08/The-EU-and-China_TwoDiffering-Approaches-to-Ethics-in-AI.pdf [https://perma.cc/9MVQ-VEQ8].
99. The BAAI is one of the many initiatives funded by the Chinese government to meet
the ambitious goal of becoming the world’s foremost AI innovation center by 2030. See
generally JEFFREY DING, DECIPHERING CHINA’S AI DREAM: THE CONTEXT, COMPONENTS,
CAPABILITIES, AND CONSEQUENCES OF CHINA’S STRATEGY TO LEAD THE WORLD IN AI 10
(2018),
https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Deciphering_Chinas_AI-Dream.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DG26-YTZJ].
100. Beijing AI Principles, BEIJING ACAD. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (May 28, 2019),
http://www.baai.ac.cn/blog/beijing-ai-principles [https://perma.cc/8VLR-WABM].
101. Governance Principles for the New Generation Artificial Intelligence—Developing
Responsible Artificial Intelligence, CHINA DAILY (June 17, 2019, 3:59 PM),
www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201905/17/WS5d07486ba3103dbf14328ab7.html
[https://perma.cc/LF9G-ZMPJ].
102. Beijing AI Principles, supra note 100.
103. Id.
104. Governance Principles for the New Generation Artificial Intelligence, supra note 101.
105. Lomonosoff, supra note 98.
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The United States has taken a different approach. President Trump’s
Executive Order 13,859 clearly encourages the development of American AI
but does not make any reference to ethics.106 With the introduction of the
Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019,107 which focuses on bias in AI
decision-making, Congress has shown an interest in regulating aspects of AI,
but without a commitment to particular ethical values. Thus, it is outside the
formal rulemaking power that ethical values are being discussed. Private
entities, especially Big Tech, are putting forward their visions of how their
normative AI systems should be used.108 Last summer, Google did not seek
an extension of a high-value contract with the U.S. Department of Defense
as a consequence of pressure from its employees concerned that their AI
advances would be deployed for military uses.109 The American approach
is, therefore, a privately driven one. Whether this is preferable and more
inclusive than state-centric approaches remains to be seen.
CONCLUSION
Liability for losses linked to AI systems is a difficult emerging area that
requires further analysis. Some form of regulation is inevitable and certainly
desirable, but there is a pressing need to address the core ethical questions
that AI systems pose. While international powers position themselves for
potential hegemonic control of, and through, AI, the scientific community,
the private sector, and think tanks are pushing for more transparent and
explainable AI systems. As shown by the breadth and depth of the
presentations at the excellent Rise of the Machines Symposium, the best
models that will help us frame the right questions and formulate the proper
answers to AI challenges come from interdisciplinary efforts.

106. Exec. Order No. 13,859, 84 Fed. Reg. 3967 (Feb. 11, 2019).
107. H.R. 2231, 116th Cong. (2019).
108. See,
e.g.,
Frequently
Asked
Questions,
PARTNERSHIP
ON
AI,
https://www.partnershiponai.org/faq [https://perma.cc/MV2M-JSWK] (last visited Oct. 6,
2019) (“The Partnership on AI (PAI) is a multistakeholder organization that brings together
academics, researchers, civil society organizations, companies building and utilizing AI
technology, and other groups working to better understand AI’s impacts.”). Partnership on AI
has over ninety partners, ranging from Apple to Facebook to Google, across thirteen countries.
See also Artificial Intelligence at Google:
Our Principles, GOOGLE AI,
https://ai.google/principles [https://perma.cc/32VC-49AC] (last visited Oct. 6, 2019);
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